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Abstract
During the last decades there has been a widespread relaxation of legal entry barriers
into the banking industry, with potential beneﬁts for ﬁnancial integration and compe-
tition. Obstacles to banks’ geographical and business expansion have been removed
and branching has been substantially liberalized. This paper analyzes the determi-
nants of entry decisions into local credit markets using a unique data set before and
after deregulation of the Italian banking industry. We estimate an entry model ` a la
Poisson and ﬁnd evidence that spreads between loan and deposit rates drive entry
only for newly chartered banks, but does not aﬀect the decision to open branches of
banks operating in other markets. Branching by outside banks is instead positively
correlated with business opportunities in the provision of ﬁnancial services which do
not require the acquisition of substantial proprietary information. Both these results
are consistent with the hypothesis that in credit markets incumbents have an informa-
tional advantage over new entrants.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G21, L22,C25.
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During the last two decades a large number of countries have lifted legal barriers to entry
in the banking industry. Starting from the 70s, geographical and business segmentations
have been removed or relaxed in the United States (Berger et al., 1995) and in Europe,
where the European Union market integration has been fostered by the Single Market Pro-
gram in 1992 (Vives, 1991) and the Monetary Union in 1999 (Gual, 1999). According to
standard economic theory, removing restrictions to free entry should increase competition,
thus improving the welfare of borrowers and savers through lower loan interest rates and
higher deposit interest rates (Besanko and Thakor, 1992). This view is consistent with the
consolidated evidence stemming from the empirical literature, i.e. that there exist a positive
correlation between market concentration on prices and banks margins (Berger and Hannan,
1989; Berger, 1995). On the other hand, lending is a central activity in banking and several
studies have emphasized that the incentives to entry in credit markets can be dampened by
adverse selection and by incumbents superior information about borrowers creditworthiness.
As long as this possibility is incorporated into rational decision making, entry can be de-
terred, and incumbents can exploit informational rents (Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999; Marquez,
2002). Also when entry occurs, the persistence of some degree of market power in certain
areas of business can still dampen competition.
There are three basic ways in which a bank can enter in a market which diﬀer substantially
with respect to information barriers. First, an outside established bank can open a branch
or a subsidiary in a new market. Second, a new bank can be started. Third, an outside bank
can acquire one of the banks operating in the market. The case of a new branch opened by
an external bank is the one in which asymmetric information is likely to be most important
because the entrants’ potential borrowers are more likely to be the ones that were turned
down by the incumbents. In fact, the latter have an advantage over potential entrants due to
a better knowledge of the market. By contrast, the decision to establish a new bank usually
ripens within the local business communities and therefore the information gap with respect
to incumbent banks is likely to be small.
1We wish to thank Marcello Bofondi, Juri Marcucci, Paolo Emilio Mistrulli and Fabio Panetta for their
insightful comments. Cinzia Chini provided outstanding research assistance. The usual disclaimers apply.
The views expressed here do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy.8
Lastly, information asymmetries have little eﬀects on entry through mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&A, hereinafter), because when a bank enters a new market by M&A, it inherits
the information held by the target institution and the number of competitors remains un-
changed. Nevertheless, consolidation in the banking industry can lead to information losses
when it’s followed by substantial restructuring of loans’ portfolios.
In this paper, we focus on the ﬁrst two types of entry2 and we argue that de novo banks
are more informed entrants than banks entering opening a branch. We therefore test whether
the two types of entry are driven by proﬁt opportunities in diﬀerent activities as predicted
by the theory. In particular, high interest rate margins on lending should be associated with
de novo entry.
Conversely, business opportunities in those area characterized by a lower amount of pro-
prietary information should attract entry by outside banks via the opening of branches.
Consistently with pervious research on Italian banking markets (Bonaccorsi di Patti and
Gobbi, 2001; Focarelli and Panetta, 2003), local markets are deﬁned as the 95 provinces
(roughly corresponding to the U.S. MSA). We use data on entry in Italian local credit mar-
kets between 1990 and 2002: this sample period consists of a unique span of 12 years in
which legal and regulatory constraints were absent both for branching and for forming new
banking businesses. The number of de novo chartered banks totalled to 131 and there were
1284 cases of entry via branching. We estimate an entry model ` a la Poisson and we ﬁnd
evidence that spreads between loan and deposit interest rates drive entry only for newly
chartered banks, but not for branch opening. Moreover, branching by outside banks results
strongly hampered by higher credit risk. Both these results are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that, in credit markets, incumbents have an informational advantage over new entrants.
Since de novo banks are characterized by high mortality rates and imply larger set-up costs
than opening a branch, our ﬁndings suggest that extra proﬁts may be a persistent feature
in local credit markets. However, we argue that since lending is just one of the many source
of revenues for banks, entry barriers due to asymmetric information can be overcome when-
2In doing so, we stick to the mainstream approach established by Joe S. Bain (1956): “[...] As a ﬁrst ap-
proximation, entry of a new ﬁrm may be taken to mean the combination of two events: (1) the establishment
of an independent legal entity, new to the industry [...]; and (2) the concurrent building or introduction by
the new ﬁrm of physical production capacity that was not used for production in the industry prior to the
establishment of the new ﬁrm. [...] This deﬁnition excludes two related events from the concept of “entry”.
The ﬁrst is the acquisition of existing producing capacity by a new legal entity [...]. The second exclusion is
is the expansion of capacity by an established ﬁrm [...] (p.9).9
ever banks compete also for the supply of a wide range of services which do not require
proprietary information.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we survey the empirical contributions
related to entry in banking markets. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology
used, whereas Section 4 summarizes the main empirical ﬁndings. Finally, in Section 5 some
concluding remarks are drawn.
2 Entry and Information
Bank lending is based on bilateral contracts, where borrowers usually are better informed
than lenders on their ability to repay the loan. Banks can partially overcome this gap gath-
ering information on borrowers through screening tests and repeated interactions. In most
cases, this kind of information is proprietary, so that entrants in credit markets are likely
to face severe adverse selection problems. Adverse selection is greater for new entrants be-
cause the pool of their applicants is likely to include those potential borrowers previously
rejected by mature banks in the market (Shaﬀer, 1998). Furthermore, a relevant amount
of information used by banks for screening loan applicants and for monitoring borrowers is
generated through repeated interaction with their customers (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992;
Boot and Thakor, 2001). A large number of studies, both of theoretical and of empirical
nature, has documented that long term relationships established between lenders and bor-
rowers are an important feature of most bilateral credit markets. Since this kind of valuable
information can be acquired only on a market-speciﬁc “learning by doing” basis, incumbents
creditworthiness assessments are likely to be more precise than those of the entrants.
Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) and Marquez (2002), present formal models in which asym-
metric information acts as a barrier to entry in the credit market and incumbents extra
proﬁts are proportional to their informational advantage. Lenders can eﬀectively capture
borrowers’ creditworthiness when the latter cannot credibly communicate to third parties.
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2003) show that competition from outside (uninformed) lenders
can induce incumbents to reallocate their loan portfolios towards more opaque borrowers.
The strength of information barriers in preventing entry depends on the weight of lending
and other “relationship intensive” activities over total banking activities. A large number
of services provided by banks do not involve acquisition of speciﬁc proprietary information.10
Both in the U.S. and in Europe a substantial proportion of gross revenues comes from non
interest income, i.e. from fees and securities trading (OECD, 2003). Also within the lending
business, the importance of proprietary information varies according to the characteristics of
borrowers and markets. Granting credit to small and medium-sized ﬁrms or highly innovative
young ﬁrms usually requires a larger amount of soft information than that required for
participating into syndicated loans to a multinational corporation.
Diﬀerent types of entering lenders can be expected to cope in diverse ways with propri-
etary information. De novo banks are potentially in a better position than outside established
banks to compete with incumbents in lending to opaque borrowers, for several reasons. First
of all, in the vast majority of cases, de novo banks are started within the local business com-
munity, and they share most of the soft information available to the incumbents. Secondly,
de novo banks are typically small institutions. Both theoretical and empirical work has
shown that small institutions have a comparative advantage in processing soft information
with respect to large, hierarchical organizations (Stein, 2002; Berger et al., 2003). Moreover,
there is evidence that de novo banks tend to allocate a higher percentage of their loan port-
folio to small business than other banks of similar size and characteristics (Goldberg and
White, 1998). This ﬁnding is consistent with the fact that the establishment of a new bank
responds to business opportunities with opaque borrowers. We should therefore expect that
entry is more likely to be hampered where lending is relatively more important with respect
to other banking activities and publicly available information about borrowers is scarce.
To our knowledge, the sharp predictions of the theoretical models about the role of
asymmetric information as a source of barriers to entry have not yet been empirically tested.
Marquez (2002) argues that informational asymmetries are a key factor in explaining the fact
that foreign banks enter into a domestic markets via M&As and not through the opening
of branches (see also Vesala, 1995). Focarelli and Pozzolo (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial centers
attract branches of foreign banks, but not subsidiaries, while lower regulatory restrictions on
banking activities are associated with a stringer presence of foreign subsidiaries, but not of
branches. Shaﬀer (1998) and Bofondi and Gobbi (2003) provide indirect evidence about the
role of information in rising the costs of entry showing that the loan default rates experienced
by the entrants is higher than those of the incumbents.
Speciﬁc studies on entry in local banking markets have addressed two main issues. The
ﬁrst one is the responsiveness of entry to extra-proﬁts of the incumbent ﬁrms. Amel and11
Liang (1997) estimate a two-equation model of entry and proﬁts for the U.S. Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs) and non-MSA counties over the period 1977-88. However, entry is
deﬁned either by the chartering of de novo banks or the opening of new branch oﬃces by
existing banks, and therefore it is not possible to disentangle the eﬀects across diﬀerent types
of entry. The main ﬁnding is that entry is positively correlated with market size, proﬁts and
market growth.
The second issue is related with the outburst of de novo chartered banks in the U.S. over
the past two decade (De Young, 1999). Moore and Skeleton (1998) provide evidence that
the birth rate of de novo banks has been particularly high in concentrated local markets,
where the presence of small banks is low. This is consistent with the idea that de novo
banks have an incentive to enter markets where proﬁts’ opportunities come from lending to
small and medium size enterprises. A few papers have investigated the relationship between
merger activity and de novo entry. Analyzing de novo chartered banks and thrifts during the
period 1995-98, Seelig and Critchﬁeld (2003) ﬁnd a positive correlation between entry and
merger activity. They conclude that M&A activity causes de novo entry because it enhances
business opportunities. Berger et al. (2000) investigate the same topic over a longer period,
from 1980 to 1998, and ﬁnd opposite results. Mergers observed in that period explain about
one ﬁfth of de novo entry in MSAs and about one tenth of entry in rural counties. The result
is interpreted as evidence that the reduction in small business lending following M&As may
be, at least partially, compensated by de novo entry.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
In this study we use a unique data set with annual information on entry in local bank markets
over the period from 1990 to the second quarter of 2002. The choice of our sample period
is motivated by two major changes in regulation. In 1989 the law implementing the First
Banking Directive removing the impediments to the establishment of new banks was fully
enforced in Italy. This change in regulation represented a marked change from the experience
of the previous decades: from 1966 to 1990, in fact, the chartering of new banks had been
restricted to mutual institutions and to subsidiary of foreign banks. The new legislation12
ensured the possibility of chartering new banks, provided the fulﬁllment of requirements in
terms of by-laws, minimum capital endowments and personal standards both of the founders
and of the management.3
In March 1990, also bank branching was fully liberalized: a longstanding policy of struc-
tural controls on entry in local banking markets came to an end. Legal barriers to entry
were justiﬁed on the view that “[T]he prior authorization for the establishment of new bank
branches is justiﬁed by the fact that market forces alone are insuﬃcient to spontaneously
produce structures which are both stable and eﬃcient. Its use is intended to prevent the in-
stability that could ensue for the banking markets from a disorderly proliferation of branches
and thus to limit the costs for the system” (Bank of Italy, 1984, p. 229). According to the
new regulation, the Bank of Italy, which is in charge of supervising the banking system, can
deny its permission to the opening of a new branch on the grounds of ﬁnancial inadequacy.
In our analysis, we assume that local credit markets are deﬁned as the 95 Italian provinces.4
The identiﬁcation of local markets with provinces is supported by the available evidence
on the reach of bank-ﬁrm relationships. For instance, Bonaccorsi di Patti (2003) shows
that more than 80 percent of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ credit relations is established with banks
branches in the same province. We identify a case of entry when a new bank or a branch
is established, and, in the case of branching, the bank did not have a branch in that mar-
ket before, in line with other empirical studies (Amel and Liang, 1997). Taking a further
step, we keep the analysis on two levels, deﬁning two types of entry, which are aﬀected by
diﬀerent informational asymmetries. The ﬁrst is represented by pure entry, that means a
newly chartered bank (or de novo) entering a market, while the second encompasses entry
through branching. We do not consider branch oﬃces of foreign banks, because they tend to
locate in large metropolitan areas and to develop relations mostly with large multinational
corporations.5 In identifying de novo entry, we consider all the newly chartered banks in
our sample period, with three exceptions. First, we exclude new charters arising from M&A
deals. Second, we also exclude institutions which were newly chartered as special-purpose
3See the “Testo Unico Bancario”, Second Edition July 2000, Capo II, Art. 14 and 15.
4Presently, Italy is divided in 103 provinces. However, since 8 provinces were established in 1995 and our
sample period ranges from 1990 to 2002, we use the old administrative boundaries for the deﬁnition of local
markets.
5We also exclude entry through acquisition of pre-existing branches, since, in this case, the number of
competitors in each market is not subject to change.13
aﬃliates of existing banks or banking groups. Third, we do not treat as de novo entrants
those non bank ﬁnancial companies which successfully applied for a full banking license.
Using this set of restrictions, we identify among the new charters those institutions which
have been established following a true entry decision.6 Since de novo entry is a relatively
low frequency event, we divide the time interval in three sub-periods: 1990-1993, 1994-1997
and 1998-2002.7
In the time frame considered, 131 new banks have been chartered, which amounts to
an yearly average of 10.5, which compares with 11.8 during the decade 1980-89 (Figure
1). As suggested also by Santarelli (2000), the regulatory reform introduced in the Italian
banking sector fostered a “pre-entry” selection process, leading to a higher average start-up
size after deregulation. Moreover, the slight decline of the number of newly founded banks
is not surprising when compared with the enormous expansion of branch oﬃces. Between
1990 and 2002, there have been 1281 cases of entry through branching, corresponding to an
annual average of 113 entry cases. In the 80s the number of entries through branch opening
averaged to 50 per year (Figure 2). Also in the post liberalization period the vast majority
of de novo banks have been chartered as mutual banks (88 out of 131) or as co-operative
banks (26) and only a few as joint stock corporations.
The mortality rate of de novo banks has been very high: only one half of them was still
chartered at the end of the sample period. Looking at the post-entry performance of newly
chartered banks, the progress of building up market shares has been rather slow for both type
of entrants. Table 1 reports the situation of the average entrant in the market it entered
after three years. The number of available observations is lower with respect to the full
sample because of the truncation problem and because of exit, due to several reasons. For
de novo banks, the most frequent reason for exit is infant mortality. The fall in the number
of entrants through branching for which data on market share becomes available is due to
the M&A wave occurred in that period. Nonetheless, we can observe about 73 percent of
total de novo entrants and 42 percent of entrants via branching. After three years, market
6A similar approach has been adopted by Seelig and Critchﬁeld (2003).
7In this, we follow Amel and Liang (1997) who also use three-years time windows. One one hand, counting
the number of entries every year would have led to a great disproportion of zeros. On the other, letting the
time frame being the whole interval 1990-2002 would have drastically reduced the number of observations.
It’s worth to remind that the unit of observation is the number of entries in one province in a given time
frame.14
shares of entrants remain below one half percentage point of lending to non ﬁnancial ﬁrms
within the local market. The same holds in the business of saving management services, here
proxied by the amount of securities held on customers’ accounts. Although the analysis of
post-entry performance falls beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that de novo
entrants, on average, have gained larger market shares than entrants through branching in
small business lending.8 The opposite occurs for lending to non ﬁnancial corporations and for
saving management services, where entrants through branching seems to have a competitive
advantage with respect to de novo banks. This evidence supports the idea that de novo
banks may be more suited to serve opaque borrowers.9
3.2 Methodology
From a methodological point of view, since the number of entries is typically a count data,
Poisson regression models provide a standard framework for econometric analysis. Let y be
a random variable denoting the number of occurrences of a certain phenomenon during a





The Poisson distribution has some peculiar properties: the ﬁrst two are necessary condi-
tions for a random variable to be Poisson distributed, while the latter are descriptive features.
The parameter ¸, known as the unobserved rate of incidence, is the expected number of times
that an event occurred per unit of time. In particular, it can be thought as the mean of the
expected counts, E (y) = ¸. The variance is equal to the mean, V (y) = ¸. We refer to this
property as equidispersion. Very often count data exhibit a variance greater than the mean,
that indicates overdispersion: speciﬁc models were built to deal with it. As the parameter
¸ increases, the probability that a zero event occurs decreases: in spite of that, in many
empirical situations, there are often more observed zero events than a Poisson model would
predict. Again, if the parameter ¸ increases, the Poisson distribution approximates to the
8Small businesses are deﬁned as sole proprietorships and partnerships with less than 20 employees. In
Italy, this kind of ﬁrms account for about one ﬁfth of total bank lending to non ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
9The pattern of market shares gained by entrants through branching is also consistent with the predictions
in Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2003, that incumbents tend to reallocate their loan portfolio towards more
opaque borrowers.15
Normal distribution.
We assume that the dependent variables y1;y2;¢¢¢ ;yn; i.e. the number of banks which









The conditional mean of the dependent variable is supposed to depend on an individual’s
characteristics (xi) according to the following model:
¸i = E (yijx) = exp(xi¯) (3)
While the conditional mean of the error terms is zero, the errors are heteroskedastic by
construction, since V (") = E (yjx) = exp(xi¯).













Maximum likelihood estimation can be easily used (see Maddala 1982 for the correspond-
ing expressions of the Hessian), since the likelihood function is globally concave. As pointed
out before, the mean-variance equality condition is very restrictive: for this reason, a large
number of techniques for detecting and modelling overdispersion were developed in the last
years (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984; Dean and Lawless 1989; Cameron and Trivedi,
1990, among others). In some cases the data generating process adds more mass at the
zero value than a Poisson Regression Model would predict10: this excess of zeros may be
explained by the presence of a dual regime11 data generating process. The ﬁrst stage is ruled
by a model that assigns some probability of moving from the zero state to another state in
which the event may occur. Then, this second stage is characterized by a true event-count
process. In other words (Zorn, 1996), we have a transition stage when the observation moves
10Actually, the same applies to every shift of the probability mass, towards zero or every other admissible
outcome.
11Here we are not referring to the “regime switching” models and the related literature, but to a model
with two stages that resemble more to a split population model.16
from one state in which the event cannot occur to another stage in which the event occurs
at some rate ¸i.
(
yi = 0 with probability ±i
yi » P (¸i) with probability (1 ¡ ±i)
(5)
Accordingly, the probability of obtaining a zero count is deﬁned as:
Pr(yi = 0) = ±i + (1 ¡ ±i)exp(¡¸i) (6)
and the probability of obtaining a non zero count is :





One should note that this parameterization with excess zeros, implies overdispersion by
construction. In fact, V (yi) = (1 ¡ ±i)(¸i + ±i¸2
i) > E (yi).
Following Lambert (1992), we parameterize the probability ±i as a logit, allowing it to
depend on a set of diﬀerent covariates with respect to the Poisson model. This class of







If we denote with Ψyi=0 the indicator function that takes value 1 if yi = 0 and zero






















Since the parameters ¸i and ±i are functionally independent, the joint log likelihood in
3.2 can be maximized by conventional methods.17
In order to test overdispersion in our data, we estimate ﬁrst a Negative Binomial Regression
Model (hereinafter, NBRM). This model allows for a simple variance speciﬁcation as:
V (yjx) = ¸ + ®¸
2 (10)
Then, a one-tailed t-test of the hypothesis H0 : ® = 0 is used to detect overdispersion.
Note that, if ® is zero, the NBRM reduces to the Poisson Regression Model.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Variables
We estimate separately two entry models: one for de novo banks and the other for an out-
side bank opening a new branch. The unit of observation is a market in one of the three
time intervals 1990-93, 1994-97 and 1998-2002. We include period dummies12 to control for
business cycle and other common factors which may have inﬂuenced entry decisions. In our
basic model, we assume that entry depends on market size and the degree of market compe-
tition. Market size is measured by the population in the province, in log scale (LNPOP). The
degree of competition is approximated alternatively by the standard Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann
concentration (HERF) index computed using banks’ market shares, or the spread between
average interest rates on loans and average interest rates on deposits (SPREAD). We have
computed the Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann index using banks’ market shares in terms of loans,
deposits and branches. The results are substantially unaﬀected and we present only those
estimates with the Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann index based on branches’ concentration, which is
more robust with respect to demand ﬂuctuations.13
To avoid problems with structural diﬀerences in loan’s maturity across provinces, we use
interest rates charged on short term lending, with original maturity under 18 months.
Since we do not have reliable measures of prices for other banking activities in the several
local markets, we proxy the potential business from the provision of services by the sum of
the deposits and the amount of securities deposited at the banks by the household sector,
12Even if not reported in the tables for sake of clarity, their coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant.
13Let nij be the number of branches of bank i (i = 1:::N) in the local market j, nj the number of








standardized by the number of branches (in the log scale, SERVICES). This variable should
capture business opportunities related to payment securities (through the quantity of de-
posits) and, more importantly, the scope for expanding the activities related to household
asset management. The latter has been one of the major sources of income growth for Italian
banks in the second half on the 1990s and a key driver of M&A deals (Focarelli et al., 2002).
Diﬀerences in income across the provinces are accounted by per capita GDP (in log scale;
LNGDPpc) and those in credit risk by average loan default rate (RISK).
We also control for possible eﬀect of M&A in driving entry. According to a large stream
of literature, M&As within the banking industry can aﬀect the supply side in several ways:
increasing eﬃciency (Focarelli and Panetta, 2003), changing business focus of the emerging
intermediaries (Berger et al., 2000), altering the incentives between relationship-based and
other types of lending (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2003). Henceforth, entry through
acquisition of an existing bank is likely to have substantial indirect eﬀects on other kind
of entry decisions. The intensity of M&A activity is measured as the share of branches
interested by this phenomenon. In particular, we consider two types of M&As: high and
low (M&AH and M&AL, respectively). In the former, a total acquisition occurs, with a full
“brand change” and very likely the market strategies of the head bank are transmitted to the
acquired one. In the latter, the bank interested in the acquisition maintains its identity. Our
hypothesis is that in the second case the informational advantage of the acquired incumbent
is not dispersed: this can be relevant in those cases where soft information matters.
In some speciﬁcations we also take into account market characteristics which should
approximate borrowers degree of opaqueness, i.e. the weight of small ﬁrms (SMALL) in that
province in terms of employment.14
To circumvent endogeneity problems and to smooth potential outliers, according to data
availability, some variables refer to the year before the time interval considered (like HERF,
SERVICES, SPREAD, M&A) and the others are the averages of the three yearly observations
before the time interval (LNGDPpc, LNPOP, RISK, SMALL). Our testing strategy consists
of estimating the same models using as left hand variable alternatively the number of entry
via the establishment of de novo institutions and the opening of branches from outside banks.
According to the theory of informational barriers, the set of right hand side variables we have
14The ratio between the number of employees in ﬁrms with less than 20 employees and the total employ-
ment.19
identiﬁed should have diﬀerent eﬀects on the two types of entry. The market concentration
index (HERF) is expected to have positive eﬀect in driving de novo entry. It may also have a
positive eﬀect on entry via branches, and these are still the most important delivery channels
for the whole range of banking services, since relatively prosperous local economies present
both lower credit risks and a higher demand for ﬁnancial services other than lending and
fund-raising.
SERVICES should aﬀect mainly entry through branching since it captures the opportu-
nities for low information intensity business, meanwhile its eﬀect on the creation of de novo
institutions is a priori uncertain. On the opposite, SMALL should have positive coeﬃcients
on the de novo equation because it should be correlated with information intensive lending
activities. By the same argument, these variables should be negatively correlated with entry
through branching. Finally, regarding the two variables related to mergers and acquisitions
(M&AH) and (M&AL) there are two factors to be considered. On the one hand M&A deals
usually originate larger and more complex institutions which may be less willing to lend to
informational opaque borrowers and hence attracting de novo entry. On the other hand,
whenever the cut-oﬀ borrowers belong to the riskier categories, the adverse selection faced
by the entrants via branches is ampliﬁed.
Table 3 summarizes the overall pattern of expected signs of the estimated coeﬃcients.
4.2 Empirical Findings
The variables RISK, SPREAD, LNGDPpc and SERVICES are strongly correlated among
them as well as SPREAD and HERF and hence, a full-ﬂedged speciﬁcation would incur
in serious problems of multicollinearity. Moreover, the equidispersion hypothesis is always
rejected: accordingly, we estimate a two-stages model as in equation (5).15 Thus we estimate
several parsimonious speciﬁcations in which alternatively we use HERF or SPREAD and only
a subset of the other variables. In Tables 5 and 6 estimation results are reported.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we simply regress (using a ZIP model) the number of entry on the
concentration index (HERF) and market size (LNPOP). The results for the de novo model
are reported in column 1 of Table 4 and those for the branching entry in column 1 of Table
15For sake of brevity, we did not report the results of Poisson and NBRM, as well as the ﬁrst logit
regression. In this ﬁrst stage model - the inﬂation stage - we used time dummies, the number of banks active
in the province and its square as covariates. These results are available from the authors upon request.20
5. Concentration has a positive eﬀect on de novo entry statistically diﬀerent from zero and
a negative one, albeit estimated in a rather imprecise way on attracting branches of outside
banks. Using SPREAD as a measure of market proﬁtability (columns 2, Tables 4 and 5)
the pattern is reinforced: large margins in the lending activity stimulate the establishing of
new banks but seem to be an obstacle to the opening of branch oﬃces by existing banks.
The latter results can be spurious because SPREAD is positively correlated with risk. We
therefore introduce RISK as a control variable which turns out to have a strong positive
eﬀect only on de novo entry, while a highly negative one on branching.
Then, including per capita GDP as a control both for risk and for overall market eco-
nomic conditions, SPREAD has still a positive eﬀect on de novo entry (column 3, Table 4),
meanwhile its coeﬃcient is negative but not diﬀerent from zero in the branching equation
(column 4, Table 5). Overall, from this ﬁrst block of estimates we derive evidence that
market concentration and, more eﬀectively, interest rate margins inﬂuence de novo entry
but not entry through the opening of branch oﬃces.
A further step is to introduce a variable which captures market opportunities for expand-
ing services not related to lending (SERVICES). As it can be seen from columns 4 in Tables
4 and 5, this variable has no impact on de novo entry, but it is a powerful factor in attracting
entry via branching.
We also investigated the eﬀects of variables which proxy for the opaqueness of the business
sector, in terms of average ﬁrm size (SMALL). The estimated eﬀects are negligible and not
statistically diﬀerent from zero in the case of de novo entry, but negative (column 5, Table
4), and substantial for entry through branches (column 5, Table 5).
Finally we also checked for eﬀects of M&As, ﬁnding that they have no eﬀects on the
formation on new banks (column 6, Table 4) and that in the case of “soft” acquisitions they
may have deterred entry with branches (column 6, Table 5). This result is consistent with
the ﬁnding of Focarelli et al. (2002) that a major determinant of acquisition is the expansion
of fees and commission services. More aggressive policies of the acquired banks in this area
























Table 1. Entrants’ Market Shares in Diﬀerent Business Lines Three Years after
Entry (percentages).
“Small businesses” are deﬁned as sole proprietorships and partnerships with less than 20
employees. Source: Bank Supervisory Reports.
De Novo Banks New Branches
Mean Range Mean Range
Lending to Small Firms
Farming 0.22 0-5.54 0.25 0-6.39
Manufacturing and Energy 0.49 0-2.51 0.43 0-7.65
Trade and Other Services 0.46 0-5.51 0.38 0-5.70
Construction 0.40 0-7.36 0.34 0-7.33
Total 0.43 0-4.91 0.39 0-6.60
Lending to Large and Medium-Sized Firms
Farming 0.12 0-3.96 0.31 0-19.60
Manufacturing and Energy 0.21 0-6.45 0.44 0-11.08
Trade and Other Services 0.26 0-4.95 0.48 0-5.76
Construction 0.26 0-5.70 5.66 0-12.73
Total 0.21 0-5.43 0.47 0-6.43
Saving Management Services
Securities on Customers Accounts 0.12 0-2.22 0.27 0-6.85
Number of banks 96 51823
Table 2. Expected sign of the estimation results.
HERF is the Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann concentration ratio; SPREAD is the diﬀerence between
average interest rates on loans and deposit; RISK is the average loan default rate; LNGDPpc
is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP; SERVICES is the sum of the deposits and
the amount of securities deposited by the household sector, standardized for the number
of branches; SMALL is the small ﬁrms’ weight, in terms of employment. Source: Bank
Supervisory Reports.
Types of Entry HERF SPREAD RISK
De novo + + +/?
Branches +/? - -
LNGDPpc SERV ICES SMALL
De novo +/? ? +
Branches + + -24
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
DENOVO is the number of de novo entries; NEW BRANCH is the number of entries through
branching in province; HERF is the Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann concentration ratio; SPREAD
is the diﬀerence between average interest rates on loans and deposit; LNPOP is the natural
logarithm of the resident population; LNGDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP;
RISK is the average loan default rate; SERVICES is the sum of the deposits and the amount
of securities deposited by the household sector, standardized for the number of branches, in
log scale; M&AH is the share of branches in a province interested in M&As, with a total
acquisition occurring; M&AL is the share of branches in a province interested in M&A,
with only a partial acquisition occurring; SMALL is the small ﬁrms’ weight, in terms of
employment; NBANKS is the number of banks active (with headquarters) in a province.
Source: Bank Supervisory Reports.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DENOVO 0.460 0.969 0.000 7.000
NEW BRANCH 4.951 6.364 0.000 48.000
HERF 0.150 0.068 0.032 0.391
SPREAD 7.485 1.303 3.890 10.980
LNPOP 13.021 0.688 11.432 15.189
LNGDPpc 2.545 0.274 1.932 3.107
RISK 0.035 0.022 0.004 0.135
SERVICES 10.884 0.514 9.673 12.069
M&AH 0.025 0.060 0.000 0.449
M&AL 0.020 0.055 0.000 0.415
SMALL 48.132 9.417 24.563 78.425
NBANKS 29.712 21.706 6.000 163.000Figure 1. Total number of de novo entries over time.
Simple count of de novo entries, i.e. the number of new banks started in the period from
1980 to 2002. Source: Bank Supervisory Reports.
Figure 2. Total number of entries through branching over time
Simple count of entries through branching, i.e. the number of branch opened by an outside

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All the estimates reported in Tables 4 - 5 may suﬀer from some degree of endogeneity, even
if lagged variables were used. In order to test empirically the presence of this problem, an
Instrumental Variables (IV) technique has been implemented. To our knowledge, no IV
technique has been developed so far for this class of models, and for this reason, a transfor-
mation was required. For skewed data, standards transformations are the log transformation
or the square-root transformation. Due to the presence of lots of zeros, the squared-root
transformation was employed. Following McCullagh and Nelder (1989), we let y = ¸(1 + ").
























If y is Poisson distributed, the error term " =
(y¡¸)
¸ , has the ﬁrst four moments respec-































































Accordingly, if y is Poisson distributed,
p
y is close to be homoskedastic and symmetric
and,
p
yi can be regressed on xi simply by OLS. The usual t-statistics can be used for
inference, but caution is needed for the interpretation of the coeﬃcients.17
In section 3.2 the right estimation procedure was presented; here the model has been
linearized in order to check for possible endogeneity of some variables. We took into account
the basic speciﬁcations of our model, i.e. (Number of entries)= f (HERF;LNPOP), or
alternately, (Number of entries)= f (SPREAD;LNPOP).18 The testing strategy consists












18We are aware that, in this way, the estimates would not be eﬃcient, but the only aim of this analysis is29
in estimating the same model with OLS and IV and to test whether the coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcatively diﬀerent. For this purpose, a simultaneous estimate of the two equations is
required (in a seemingly unrelated regression model spirit). As instrument, pre-deregulation
market structure was used (the Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann concentration index in 1986). Then,
given the arrays containing the two sets of estimates, a Â2 test was performed in order to
evaluate the signiﬁcance level of the diﬀerences between the corresponding parameters. The
results are shown in Table A, and looking at the Â2 test, one can conclude that there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients produced by OLS and IV estimates, supporting the
hypothesis that there is no endogeneity problem concerning market structure.
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